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philosophy is (in)famous, the combined force of their
work has been to put apologists for theory's traditional
pretensions somewhat on the defensive. The critics'
positive views about the form of moral philosophy
sans moral theory, have, however, been even more
varied (and rather vaguer) than their critiques. From
the lack of an articulate positive program, along with
suspicions that antitheory in ethics might have strongly
conservative implications, the theorists have taken heart.
Sapontzis' contribution to this debate-although he
modestly does not identify it as such-is quite
important. He provides an object lesson in how to do
moral philosophy without a commitment to a single
unified theory which demonstrates in the abstract what
"makes right acts right." In so doing, he shows that it
doesn't take such a theory to provide an intellectually
respectable critique of a major social institution.

In a series of articles dating back to the late
1970's, Steven F. Sapontzis has developed a position
on our moral relationship to nonhuman animals which
is at least as searching and as original as the better
known work of Singer and Regan. Morals. Reason,
and Animals assembles and refines the themes
introduced in his earlier essays. The result is an
interesting contribution to a discussion in contemporary
moral theory, as well as an examination of our dealings
with nonhumans that shows just how thoroughly
dubious they are.
A major ongoing debate in moral philosophy
concerns what, to use a characteristically Sapontzian
way of putting things, might be called the
(in)Significance of Moral Theory. Influential writers
such as Bernard Williams, Annette Baier, Martha
Nussbaum, and Alasdair MacIntyre, among many others,
have all raised considerable doubts about the
philosophical enterprise of"grounding" ethics in moral
theory, especially if that is taken to mean one which
claims to be able to derive our moral duties from a small
number of basic principles. l Although the critics'
reasons for inveighing against the "standard" conception
of ethical theory exhibit the variety for which
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Sapontzis' own "anti-theoretical" tendencies
dovetail with what is perhaps the leading idea of his
book, namely, that we have made altogether too much
of reason as a qualification for moral status. The kind
of reason of which philosophers tend to be fond, as
Sapontzis sees it, not only can't build theories that will
conclusively resolve moral quandaries, but is also beside
the point as a requirement for being morally significant.
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to them. He does admit that nonhumans lack the
interest and ability to strive to make the world a better
place; hence. they are not fully moral agents. But, like
"kindhearted. spontaneously generous [and] compas
sionate people" (p. 45). they are virtuous agents, and
hence their acts possess moralad value.
This may strike even friends of animals as a bit
extreme; they may recall Aristotle's distinction between
"natural virtue." which is the portion of children and
animals. and "virtue in the full sense of the word."
which requires (normal human) intelligence (cf.
Nichomacheaa Ethics VI.13). For example. John
McDowell. who accepts this distinction. has recently
contrasted the virtue of a genuinely kind person with
"the outcome of a blind. non-rational habit or instinct.
like the courageous behavior- so called only by
courtesy-of a lioness defending her cubs...3 But
Sapontzis is skillful atdisanning such doubts. He points
out that there is a vast difference between highly
routinized. blindly instinctual behavior. such as the
spawning instinctofsalmon. and the much more flexible,
context-sensitive actions of such social animals as
wolves. who exhibit faithful and affectionate behavior
as spouses and parents, and are. in words borrowed from
Mary Midgley. "paragons of steadiness and good
conduct" (p. 27).
Narrowing the perceived moral gap between
nonhumans and humans is a significant result, especially
when coupled with Sapontzis' critique of the concept
of 'personhood.' Philosophers often take the conditions
for inclusion in the set of persons to be identical with
those necessary and sufficient for having a right to life.
Some claim that the concept of a person includes many
but not all human beings (fetuses. infants. and the
permanently and profoundly retarded are the usual
exceptions) and some nonhumans (primates. cetaceans
and perhaps others as well). Personhood may thus
appear to be an ethically progressive concept, as it is
nonspeciesist, and significantly expands the sphere of
rights holders. But, as Sapontzis sees it, despite its
advances over previously popular moral notions.
personhood still retains "the logic of prejudice." The
upshot of his discussion is that basing moral status on
what he calls "metaphysical" characteristics of a thing
(i.e.• what basic ontological category it occupies. of
which personhood may be an example) is as morally
arbitrary as basing moral status on considerations such
as race or gender. The only defensible grounds for
assigning or withholding moral status is the character

Nonhwnans cannot engage in moral theory. nor. often.
in the kinds of activities which moral theorists claim to
be crucial for moral standing (which are many times
almost identical with those needed to build a theory).
But careful attention to what Sapontzis calls "everyday
morality" shows that envisaging kingdoms of ends. or
universalizing the maxims of our actions. or being
strictly impartial. are not needed in order to behave well.
nor to merit the respectful concern of others.
Accordingly. when Sapontzis sees a conflict between
philosophical accounts of ethics. and common moral
thinking and behavior. the philosophical accounts are
shown the door. For example. if Kant holds that the
only actions which have true moral value are those
which proceed out of a respect for the moral law.
Sapontzis will note that we more greatly prize the
parent who acts in behalf of her children out of love
than the parent who acts out of duty alone; if Singer
claims that taking a moral point of view demands that
we be prepared to defend our judgements and behavior
with impartial reasons. Sapontzis counters with
examples of people who may lack what William
Ruddick has called "discursive moral competence," but
who we would all admit are capable ofacting morally. 2
Sapontzis unfolds this general theme in two ways.
He argues that attempts to rule animals out of the sphere
of moral considerability are speciously philosophical in
that they. for example. pitch the standard of rationality
supposedly required for moral standing so high as to
leave many humans out in the cold. The other tactic is
to show that the moral aims that commonly run through
our community would all be better served by a policy
of liberating animals than they would by continuing
the status quo.
The first strategy occupies the beginning of the book.
where he concentrates on showing the limits of reason's
importance for moral status. A particularly significant
claim here is that nonhuman animals can act in ways
that have a moral value that reflects on the actor.
Sapontzis calls this "agent dependent" moral value. or
moralad value. This is a bold idea. It pulls nonhumans
into the moral community not simply as "moral
patients." but as moral agents as well. and in so doing,
questions common ideas about the gulf separating
humans and nonhumans that are WlChallenged even by
prominent proponents of animals. Many nonhumans.
Sapontzis says. meet all the reasonable criteria for acting
in moralad ways: they act freely and straightforwardly
in response to the goods and evils a situation presents
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overscrupulousness. Whether it is a good thing to make
the part of our lives that involves nonhumans more or
less morally complex is not a matter that can be
reasonably influenced by DOling that, were we to think
of them as more morally signifICant, we'd have to make
more and more difficult ethical decisions; the same
could be said in support of a proposal to extend moral
recognition to used cars. The crux of the matter is
whether doing so involves proper discernment or
overscrupulousness. What Sapontzis may be illustraling
here is that the various threads of common morality
interpenetrate and reinforce one another, and that each
borrows from the other in showing where practical
reason shoukllead us.
A line more diRctly supported by our concern for
moral character returns to the argument that animals
can be virtuous agents, and suggests that there is a
certain incoherency in professing great moral respect
for virtue, but none for those who are virtuous. What is
the sense in admiring the deed and kicking the doer?
This argument appears here and there in Sapontzis'
book, but oddly enough it is not worked out in much
detail in the section that explores how respect for virtue
motivates animal liberation.
Another part of the common morality is the goal of
making the world a happier place. Although the point
has been disputed, it seems very likely that a policy of
reducing and ultimately ending the vast suffering that
nonhumans undergo at our hands would substantially
enhance the balance of satisfied to frustrated interests
in the world, and thus contribute to this goal. It is true
that such a shift would cause pelSonaI and systematic
dislocations for humans, but these, as Sapontzis points
out, would be eased by the development of alternatives
to animal-consuming industries, and by the fact that
the shifts would occur over an extended period of time
(although, presumably, this time lag in implementing
radical reforms is something to be regretted, not
welcomed, by serious animal advocates). But the
fundamental point is that the stresses occasioned by the
change would fade with time, but the benefits enjoyed
by animals would continue indefinitely into the future.
This consideration, of course, presupposes a certain
scope to everyday morality's concern with a better
world, namely, that it extends into the indefinite future.
It is worth noting that not even every version of
utilitarianism does that As Sapontzis himself thinks
that our concern with the future ought not to extmd
more than seventy-five or a hundred years hence---a

of the being in question ("or other evaluative
considerations, such as minimizing suffering, relevant
to making the world a morally better place." (p. 64»,
and this is where the significance ofanimal virtue comes
in. Animals merit our moral respect, not because they
may be persons, and not (solely) because they are
sentient, or subjects of a life, but because they are
generally decent, sometimes admirable, occasionally
heroic beings.
The book's second part clarifies and motivates the
animal liberation movement The most effective way
of examining a moral position, as Sapontzis sees it, is
to note its relationship to the three chief themes that
run through everyday morality-briefly, these are
promoting virtue, making the world a happier place,
and fairness. This technique threatens to break down
if some themes supported a proposed practice, while
others run counter to it Happily-although perhaps
surprisingly, given our actions-all three elements of
common morality speak for, rather than against, the
liberation of animals.
One such element is concern for moral character,
for the development of "compassion, altruism, respect
for the interests and rights of others, a sense of fairness,
a willingness to stand up and take risks for those who
cannotdefend themselves, and so forth" (p. 90). Animal
liberation contributes to this goal primarily by
extending the sphere of moral considerability. There
is simply much more that a conscientious moral agent
now has to keep in mind. The lines that divide the
world into the issues that require moral reflection and
virtue (e.g., our duties to the homeless, abortion) and
those that are morally discretionary (what to eat for
lunch, what experiments to perform in pursuit of one's
Ph.D.) will no longer be arbitrarily drawn. At the same
time, the extra challenges imparted by liberating animals
are realistic, not utopian, requiring moral seriousness,
but not sainthood. Liberating animals, although
making morality a more complex and more pervasive
part of our lives, would not overburden us; that is
not what morality is for. It would make of us a more
compassionate, more morally imaginative and
creative community, which fits in squarely with our
own best ideals.
But this line can at best lend ancillary support to a
position established on other grounds. One important
moral virtue is discernment, which involves recognizing
which issues appropriately make moral demands on us
and which do not; the corresponding vice is
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does seem intuitively correct to say that humans who
don't satisfy the so-called "circumstances ofjustice"
say, the weak and infinn-can still be treated unfairly,
and if they can, why not animals of roughly equivalent
powers and vulnerabilities? This strategy smacks of
the "argument from marginal cases," an appeal which
Sapontzis fmds weaker than many animal advocates,
as he seems to admit that our care for "marginal"
members of ourown species may be urged by sentiment,
rather than dictated by principle (see pp. 141ft). If so,
then our tenderness to the weak of our own species
even if that tenderness is expressed by a sense that it is
not fair for the strong to exploit the weak-may not be
good grounds for claiming that nonhumans are
appropriate subjects of justice. The more effective
strategy is probably to point out, as Sapontzis does, that
it seems part of the point of morality-in particular of
the part that concerns fairness-to defend the weak
against exploitation by the strong, and that any account
of justice that overlooks that is incomplete.
If there is no categorical reason for denying that
animals can be treated unjustly, then defenses of the
fairness of their treatment are generally quite lame,
although Sapontzis has the patience to show just why
they limp. There is, however, a set of considerations,
the "replacement argument," which may be of some
serious interest It contends that it is permissable to
use and kill an animal if its existence depends upon its
being used and killed by us, and if after death, it will be
replaced by another animal, which would not have
existed were the flTSt animal to remain alive, and ifboth
animals have lives TOughly equally worth living.
Sapontzis spends an entire chapter unpacking this
argument. He fIrst notes that it is a response to an
idealized case. The animals stocked in our factory farms
and our laboratories are of such moral interest precisely
because they fail to have lives worth living. Still, one
can imagine refonnsof animal research, ifnot intensive
farming, which might greatly enhance the lives of its
purpose-bred subjects. Suppose, for example, that
animals bred for research were housed in settings that
allowed them to enjoy a good deal of what life might
hold for them, were used only in crucial research, and
were painlessly euthanized. If the replacement
argument were sound, it would seem to justify this
possibility as a goal for the refonn of animal research.
Whether anyone's life is replaceable depends on
what makes a life valuable. Sapontzis displays a number
of competing accounts, which fall into utilitarian and

point to be examined later-there seems an internal
tension here, too.
Yet another tension might arise from another
difference between everyday morality's interest in
making the world a better, happier place, and that of
utilitarianism, the philosophical theory built on this
theme. The theory bids us to be stricdy impartial in
our assessment of interest satisfaction and frustmtion,
but ordinary morality has no such requirement, and, in
fact, directs us to give special regard to our kin and
friends. Yet the magnitude of animal suffering, and the
relative triviality of the human interests which can only
be served by that suffering, must trump even a moral
perspective which gives special regard to the interests
of our nearest and dearest, unless that view is simply a
rationalization for personal chauvinism of the most
extreme kind, and not a concern that the world be a
better place at all. The only plausible exception to this
is the case of the best animal-based medical research.
Research that is of high quality from both scientific
and humane standpoints, which targets debilitating and
widespread diseases. and from which there is good hope
of progress. may perhaps be justified both from a
utilitarian standpoint and from the standpoint of this
aspect of common morality. It is true that morality's
other features-the development of virtue and
fairness-might spealc against rersearch. In that case,
however, we would be in a situation of internal moral
conflict, and Sapontzis' work, resting on the conver
gence of all elements of ordinary morality on a broad
animal liberation platform, does not contain strategies
for resolving such conflict.
The final aspect of common morality is fairness.
Certainly in research, as in other aspects of our
interactions with them, animals typically bear all the
burdens while humans reap the benefits. Intuitively,
this seems unfair, a charge that could only be turned
away by considering reasons why animals simply don't
count from the perspective of fairness, or why, despite
appearances, they aren't really being treated unfairly.
Sapontzis handles the flTSt of these responses perhaps
too briefly, simply noting that to say that an animal is
being treated unfairly is not to make a category mistake.
But even if the claim isn't patent nonsense, it might
still be disguised nonsense. Some philosophers, for
example, have thought that considerations of justice
arise only among creatures that are TOughly equivalent
in their vulnerabilities to one another, a condition that
does not hold between humans and nonhumans. 4 Yet it
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A significant weakness of prior existence
utilitarianism seems its conflict with the idea that future
generations have a moral claim on us. Sapontzis'
discussion of this problem is not convincing. He points
out that, even on the prior existence view, we have
duties to the future which extend between seventy
five and one hundred years hence, since there are now
people living who will still be alive then, and, as
previously mentioned, he thinks that's long enough. But
this seems very dubious in the light of such moral
questions as arise from the production and storage of
nuclear waste, which presents dangers which extend
thousands of years into the future, and whose
management seems much more problematic as we
wonder about the reliability of storage technology not
a century, but rather a millenium ahead.
The discussion of the replacement argument
occupies a central position in the book's third part,
which also features insightful discussions of whether
animals have interests (targeting primarily R. G. Frey,
who has maintained that only language-users have
interests) and whether death is a hann to nonhumans.
In both instances, Sapontzis maintains that it is not to
the point whether a creature can cognitively entertain a
certain proposition-for example, that death is an ill.
It is sufficient that the creatures have feelings of weIl
and ill-being. Artifacts and plants fail to have morally
considerable interests precisely because they lack this
capacity to feel. Since death precludes the further
satisfaction of those interests, it is (prima facie, at least)
a hann to any interest bearer.
In the fmal part of the book, Sapontzis works out
some practical implications of the kind of animal
liberation he supports. Once again, his views are
characterized by their originality, clarity, and cogency.
His topics include the obligation to be vegetarian, the
legitimacy (or otherwise) of animal research, how we
should respond to the fact that animals prey on other
animals, and the relationship of his position to
environmental ethics. All of these discussions repay
attention, but the focus here will be on his remarks
concerning animal research.
Sapontzis argues that nonhumans should not be
exposed to greater research risks than humans. This
would not rule out animal research altogether: as he
sees it, animals can give a meaningful kind of consent
to participation in some research (typically, research
that is noninvasive, and which offers them some reward
for participation) and others can appropriately consent

nonutilitarian families. The nonutilitarian accounts are
divided in their turn: one version sees our lives as the
very source of moral value, due to our capacity for
autonomous action; the other rests our significance on
the more basic capacity simply to confer any kind of
value on things.
On Sapontzis' view, neither of these accounts will
support the replacement argument. On the frrst, the
decent exercise of their moral agency earns animals the
right to live out their lives. On the second, agents
typically value their own pursuit of their own projects;
replacement by someone else-even if she has equally
worthy projects-does not preserve that. This, of
course, would seem to assume that animals not only
have an interest in living so as to complete their projects,
but that they take an interest in living as well That non
humans typically can do so is doubtful. Nor is it clear
that valuing our own projects protects us from
replocement; surely, our replacements will value their own
projects as well, so it isn't clear what's irretrievably lost
Utilitarianism would, at any rate, seem to be the more
natural setting for the replacement argument, as it is
less hospitable to the idea that individuals-as opposed
to the experiences they "contain"-have intrinsic moral
worth. But Sapontzis argues that a general utilitarian
outlook will yield several relevant accounts of the value
of life, that only one of them clearly supports the
replacement argument, and that the considerations often
urged in behalf of that particular view are much less
persuasive than they at first appear.
Utilitarianism consists of both a theory of the good
(classically, hedonism; more currently, the view that
the satisfaction of interests is intrinsically good) and a
range principle, which detennines for whom the good
or bad consequences of a given action or policy are to
be considered. The crucial distinction for Sapontzis'
discussion is between "total population" and "prior
existence" versions of the range principle. "Total
population" utilitarianism bids us to maximize the
overall good taking into account both currently existing
sentient beings, as well as those who may come to exist;
it is distinguished from the "prior existence" version
which restricts itself to sentient beings once they have
begun to exist as such. Clearly, the "prior existence"
versions will protect animals against the prospect of
replacement, but total population versions of
utilitarianism (depending on which theory of the good
they employ) leave us more or less vulnerable to the
prospect of replacement
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plays the role of a theory of distributive justice. D. D.
Raphael, for one, claims that it does, but admits that
this is a matter even utilitarians are confused about;
Tom Regan, on the other hand, interprets the Bentharnite
notion that "each should count for one and no one for
more than one" as solely a predistributive kind of
egalitarianism, in principle compatible with hierarchical
distributions of utilities, so long as such distributions
result in an utility sum that is optimal considered
overall.6 No doubt, Bentham and others thought that
utilitarianism would have antiheirarchical implications,
but that was because they took hierarchies to have bad
consequences considered generally and impartially, not
because they had a special independent objection to
the notion.
If Regan is right, standard forms of utilitarianism as
such do not undermine the moral hierarchy presupposed
in even high quality animal research; rather, such
research may be a practical instance of the conflict
between justice and utility that utilitarianism is so often
seen as giving rise to in theory.
Since the ethical perspective of Morals. Reason, and
Animals is pluralistic, resolving this disagreement about
the implications of utilitarianism is not crucial. What
is more significant is that Sapontzis' account of animal
research succeeds in raising significant issues that have
been underexplored in what has become a huge
literature. It does, however, leave unexamined the
neglected yet natural question of what is our duty
with respect to the benefits we derive from animal
research. In other words, how close is the analogy
between our duty to stop profiting from the exploitation
ofanimals in factory farms by becoming vegetarians
which Sapontzis spends a chapter supporting-and
a duty to stop profiting from the exploitation of
animals in medical research labs-which Sapontzis
doesn't mention?
Becoming a vegetarian has virtually no negative
impact on key interests, as nutritious and tasty
substitutes are available. Boycotting medicine is not
so easy. As animal experimentation infects the whole
of medicine, refusal to profit from it is tantamount to
refusal to profit from the medical system as a whole.
It is one thing to ask a meat-eater to give up her Big
Mac. It is quite another to ask an AIDS sufferer to give
up hisAZT.
But if this difference in the character of affected
interests allows one to accept the benefits of animal
research, why does it not distinguish the moral

for them, so long as the research is innocuous, or in the
animal's own best interests. Actually, if equivalence
to human levels of protection is the touchstone, then
the net gets cast a bit wider than he suggests: well
children are legally allowed to be subjects of
experiments which place them at minimal risk and
some discomfort, even if the experiments are not in
their own interests; children who are in terminal
conditions may become part of "Phase One" drug tests,
which are of no therapeutic benefit and which may add
substantially to their discomfortS
Whatever the precise dimensions of allowable
experimentation, it seems clear that reforming scientific
research to conform with them would involve very big
changes. But animal research apologists might claim
that even on Sapontzis' account, there is a moral
difference between typical humans and nonhumans: we
are fully moral agents, capable of striving to make the
world a better place, while animals can act virtuously
in ways largely limited to the confines of the world as
it is presented to them.
There are other, more or less reasonable attempts to
make sense of the claim of human moral superiority:
our capacity for both enjoyment and suffering might
be greater than those of animals, for example. But, as
Sapontzis shows, none of this clearly demonstrates
human superiority. Unlike animals, we may have the
capacity to strive to make the world better, but what's
actually been our track record? This argument is
weakened by the very suffering which it attempts to
justify. As for our allegedly greater degrees of suffering
and enjoyment, these cut both ways: there is a wealth
of sensations closed to humans but possessed by
different animals in varying degrees, and an animal's
restricted grasp of the past and future might make
suffering harder to bear in some ways, ifeasier in others.
But even if there were ways in which humans could
be shown to be morally superior to animals, we're still
left with the issue of what behavior that superiority
would license. An interesting feature of Sapontzis'
investigation of this point is his emphasis on the
egalitarian character of utilitarianism. He notes the
antipathy to aristocracy which has traditionally been a
part of utilitarian thought, and points out that the theory
is structurally committed to regarding each individual
equally in determining the harm/benefit consequences
ofa particular activity. Hence it would not support even
the idea of moral superiority. There is, however, some
controversy over whether utilitarianism's egalitarianism
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painful electric shocks. More than half the animals
went hungry rather than subject their fellows to the pain;
animals who had previously been shocked were
especially willing to forego eating.

acceptability of the whole enterprise over that of factory
farming? In other words, many of us currently, and all
ofus potentially, owe our lives to medical interventioos,
and owe the availability of most of those interventions
to animal research. Can we consistently reap the
benefits of research, and yet demand that it be stopped
cold (as opposed to greatly reformed) before reasonable
alternatives are discovered? Might that not be asking
us to ascribe to an ethic for saints and heroes, rather
than for common folks adhering to everyday morality?
The question deserves more attention than it gets.

4 See, for example, John Rawls' discussion of the
"circumstances of justice" in A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 127ff.

5 Department of Health and Human Services
guidelines pertaining to experimentatioo on children are
discussed in Baruch Brody and Tristram Englehardt,
eds.,Bioethics: Readings and Cases (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-HaIl, 1987), pp. 266-267.

***
In the preface to Morals, Reason, and Animals,
Sapontzis anticipates that people will come to his book
wondering why, after the work of Singer, Regan,
Rollin, Clark, Midgeley and others, anything more can
usefully be said about the philosophical foundations
of animal liberation. What Sapontzis achieves is not
only to give us a new philosophical perspective on
animals-most notably, his notion that they are virtuous
agents, rather than merely subjects of moral concern
but a new view of what it is to give a philosophical
foundation to an ethical movement. He calls his book
a "second generation" contribution to the philosophical
debate on the ethics of interspecies relationships; if it
sets the tone for discussion in this generation, the
implications for both practice and theory are rich.

6 For Raphael's discussion, see Chapter 5 of his

Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1980). For Regan, see The Case for Animal Rights

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983), chapters 6 and 7.

Notes

1 A useful collection of essays on this topic is
Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson, eds., Anti-Theory
in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1989).
2 See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 9-10, referred
to in Sapontzis, p. 22.
3 John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason" in Clarke
and Simpson, p. 88. Cootrast his account with the very
effective example of nonhuman virtue given in James
Rachels' "Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty?" in
Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds., Animal Rights and
Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1976). Several primates were forced to observe
that their food-gathering activities caused conspecifics
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